Daniel Speak
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Ph.D., University of California Riverside,
Specialties: Metaphysics (esp. of the free will), Philosophy of Action, Moral Philosophy, Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion
Current Projects: At present, I am particularly intrigued by some meta-philosophical or methodological questions about the goals and limits of philosophical argument. For example, must an argument purport to increase the epistemic credibility of a thesis in order for it to count as philosophical? Similarly, can an argument increase the epistemic credibility of a thesis without making it more likely that the thesis is true? My intrigue about this set of issues is due largely to the fact that I am presently at work on a monograph defending an especially robust version of libertarianism about free will. Since this defense will make special appeal to the high moral and broadly pragmatic stakes in the free will debate, I had better find some more compelling grounds for negative answers to the above questions.
Selected Publications:
“The Impertinence of Frankfurt-style Argument,” The Philosophical Quarterly, January, 2007.
“Salvation Without Belief,” Religious Studies, 2007.
“Semi-Compatibilism and Stalemate,” Philosophical Explorations 8, 2005: 95-102.
“PAPistry: Another Defense,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 29: Free Will and Moral Reponsibility [Oxford: Blackwell, 2005].
“Toward an Axiological Defense of Libertarianism,” Philosophical Topics, Vol. 32, 2004.
“Fanning the Flickers of Freedom,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39, 2002: 91-105.
Contact Information:
University Hall 3618
Email: dspeak@lmu.edu